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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
NARVOL A. JOHNSON and LAF AUN J.
FLEMING, as the Guardian of the Person
and Estate of ARTHUR JOHNSON an
incompetent,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No.
8888

CALVIN C. JOHNSON and ANNA R.
JOHNSON, his wife,

Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
The primary parties to this suit are the only children
of Arthur Johnson, an incompetent. In a separate contested proceeding, the District Court held on August 13,
1957, that Arthur Johnson was an incompetent. A son,
Xarvol A. Johnson, and a daughter, LaFaun J. Fleming,
were appointed his guardians. They brought this suit
against their younger brother, Calvin C. Johnson, on
October 5, 1957, to set aside two deeds from the incompetent to Calvin to have a contract of sale and a will declared to be void, and for an accounting.
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The case was tried to the court without a jury. The
trial court found that since the Spring of 1955, Arthur
Johnson has not been "mentally competent and has been
physically incapacitated to handle and manage his business and affairs, during a substantial portion of said
time." The court also found that the defendant Calvin
C. Johnson had procured the deeds of conveyance by
fraud and undue influence. The court set aside both
deeds and declared the Will and the contract of sale to
be void. The court also ordered the defendants to render
an itemized account to the court "of all the assets and
property" of Arthur Johnson, the incompetent, from the
1st day of January, 1955. From this judgment, the defendants have appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants assert as the trial court's only error
of law its denial of appellants' request for a jury trial on
the issues concerning the validity of the will. Appellants
expressly admit on page 19 of their brief that they were
not entitled to a jury trial on any other issue. All other
assignments of error challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the trial court's findings. The facts
will, therefore, have to be fully set forth in connection
with our argument, and for that reason we will not discuss the facts in detail here.
The recitation of the facts by the appellants is incomplete, in that appellants fail to note the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. The basic facts are
reflected by the findings. The trial court found that since
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the death of the wife of Arthur Johnson on July 16,
1953, Arthur Johnson "has failed to maintain an active
interest in his personal and business affairs, and has
permitted the defendant Calvin C. Johnson, by default,
rather than by express authorization or consent, to oversee most of his business and affairs." (Finding No. 4)
During all of the time since the death of his wife, Arthur
Johnson has by reason of his relationship to Calvin, "reposed special trust and confidence" in Calvin, and Calvin
has obtained and exercised a dominating influence over
his father. (Finding No.7)
For approximately three years preceding the trial,
Arthur Johnson has suffered ill health and "infirmities
of age, and has undergone a number of serious surgical
operations in connection therewith, which have seriously
incapacitated him from carrying on his business and
pursuits," and Calvin has taken upon himself, particularly since the 1st of January, 1955, "the responsibility
and control over the assets and properties of the said
Arthur Johnson, and has dealt with, managed and operated said property as he has seen fit." There is no evidence that he has ever accounted to Arthur Johnson with
respect thereto. (Finding No.8) The court further found
that since "the early spring of 1955, Arthur Johnson
has not been mentally competent and has been physically
incapacitated to handle and manage his business and
affairs during a substantial portion of said time; that on
or about the 20th day of July, 1955, and again on May
20, 1956, and at times when the said Arthur Johnson was
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1n a weakened Inental and physical condition, and deprived of immediate contact with his other children and
close relatives and friends, and as a part of a fraudulent
and wrongful scheme and design to obtain from him and
without adequate consideration therefor, real property of
the said Arthur Johnson of a substantial value and comJ_Jrising farm lands with improvements and water rights"
and also valuable business properties. (Findings 9 and

10)
The court further found that Calvin Johnson
promptly recorded the warranty deed to the business
property, but failed to record the contract of sale; that
''there is no evidence in the record of any consideration
for said deed (to the business property) having passed"
from Calvin to Arthur Johnson at the time the deed was
recorded, or at any time since said date. (Findings 11
and 12)
The court also, in Finding No. 1-±, noted that Calvin
had managed the business affairs of Arthur J olmson and
had received substantial an1ounts of property and
1noneys, for which he had never accounted. The evidence
fully sustains these findings.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUSTAINS THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS.
I.

(a) IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED UNDER PRINCIPLES

OF RES JUDICATA THAT ARTHUR JOHNSON WAS
AN INCOMPETENT.
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The proceedings in the incompetency hearing were
not introduced in evidence, but were referred to on crossexamination of the various witnesses, who had testified
at the earlier hearing. It is noted on pages 5 and 6 of
appellants' brief that a petition was filed by respondents
on July 27, 1957, to have the court declare Arthur Johnson, their father, to be an incompetent. It is also there
noted that a hearing was held on August 6, 1957, and that
the court granted the petition and declared Arthur
Johnson to be an incompetent. This order is dated August 13, 1957. Although this was a contested proceeding
opposed by Calvin, no appeal was taken from that order.
In has thus become final under principles of res judicata,
and at least hy August 13, 1957, Arthur Johnson was
incompetent.
(b) SINCE THE SPRING OF 1955', ARTHUR JOHNSON
HAS BEEN MENTALLY INCOMPETENT AND
PHYSICALLY INCAPA·CITATED A SUBSTANTIAL
PORTION OF THE TIME.

Arthur Johnson was deeply affected by the death of
his wife; it took the pep out of him, and he seemed to
lose interest in the active management of his affairs.
(R. 120, 35) At the same time, he was suffering from
severe hypertension and arteriosclerosis and prostate
trouble. (R. 52-3) He had moderate to very severe hypertension as early as 1952, and he did not respond well to
treatment. (R. 53) On October 8, 1953, he underwent a
serious prostate operation in San Diego, California, and
then underwent a similar operation within a matter of
weeks thereafter. He was in great pain. (R. 38, 59, 167)
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In the latter part of December, 1953, he was again hospitalized for complications arising out of the same
trouble, and was released from the hospital in January of
1954. (R. 59) Dr. Fulstow saw him in May of 1954, and
checked Mr. Johnson's blood pressure. A_t this time it
was 228 over 144 over 140. A pressure of 135 over 85
was normal. (R. 60) In September, 1955, he complained
of "ringing in the head," which would indicate an increase r,f blood pressure. (R. 60) Taylor Crosby, administrator of Kane County Hospital, testified that Mr.
Johnson was hospitalized from April 19th to 23, 1955.
(R.lOO)

In the Spring of 1955 he underwent his first eye
operation in Salt Lake City, and in the early summer of
that year was again hospitalized for the same trouble.
In the Fall of 1955 he underwent a second eye operation
in Salt Lake City, and was under rather constant treatment during the entire Spring, Summer and Fall of that
year. (R. 167) He was hospitalized again in December of
1955. During this time, and on December 27, 1955, the
hospital records contain a note that: ··Patient up dernanding coffee (at 2:30 a.m.) up wandering, extremely
obnoxious in action." (R. 92)
The illness continued on into the Spring of 19G6.
I mrnediatel~· prior to the tirne (~Jay 20, 1956) when Calvin procured the contract of sale and the deed to the \aluable business property in l{anab, Arthur J olmson had
undergone an intensive period of serious physical disability. lie was suffering frorn acute l1igh blood pressure
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on April 30, 1956. Dr. Fulstow testified that his blood
pressure had increased to 286 over 162 over 158. (R. 55)
The doctor said this was an extremely high blood pressure and that: "Recorded blood pressures at that
amount suggests that a stroke is dangerous, the possibility of a stroke is present."
The doctor on that date administered hypertension medicine and "the patient's response was more
marked than is usually seen," and it caused an "excessive
drop in blood pressure," and Mr. Johnson fainted. He
was immediately hospitalized. (R. 54) The doctor also
noted that when extremely high blood pressure is alleviated, there may be damage to the small arteries in the
brain, and this could affect the patient's mental processes. (R. 68) Dr. Fulstow further noted that this damage
to the small arteries interferes with the nutrition of the
brain. (R. 68) He also noted that Mr. Johnson suffered
at this same time from "moderately severe" arteriosclerosis. This also would interfere with circulation.
(R. 61)
Mr. Johnson was placed in the hospital on April
30th and released May 2, 1956. He was only out of the
hospital one day, and then was re-admitted to the hospital
on ~fay 3rd, because of a bad nose bleed, which in the
opinion of Dr. Fulstow was caused by high blood pressure. (R. 63) Mr. Johnson was released from the hospital
again May 6th. The doctor noted that he made an emergency house call to attend Mr. Johnson at noon on May
15th. Mr. Johnson had fainted and was found on the
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floor. "His eyes were up in his head and he was drooling
at the mouth. He had wet all over his clothes." The
family changed his clothing and called the doctor. :i\Ir.
Johnson was immediately again placed in the hospital.
(R.171, 100, 64)
During this period of hospitalization, beginning :May
15, 1956, and ending l\Iay 20th (the date he signed the
deed) the hospital records show that l\Ir. Johnson was
out of his bed "wandering" around the hall. The attending nurse noted on the hospital records that l\Ir. Johnson "apparently does not know where he is. He was up
and about and apparently doesn't know where he is.''
(R. 93) He was released from the hospital on May 20,
1956, and it was on this date-the very day of his release
-that Calvin got the deed to the business property and
had the contract of sale and will signed. All were executed in Calvin's presence and at Calvin's hmne. (R. 510,
505, 522, Exs. 1, 2, 1-l)
In June, 1956, ~Ir. Johnson had a head cold accompanied by a fainting spell. The doctor said that following
this "he showed definite confusion" for a while. These
periods of confusion were aln1ost steady. (R. 57) The
doctor made a house call on June Sth. l\lr. Johnson suffered a stroke on June 23rd and was again hospitalized.
(R. 64)
~Ir.

Johnson was 73 yean;; of age. (R. ±9) Running
through this Pntire period of tiine, he suffered frmn nose
bleeds, (R. 56) He had severe sick headaches. (R. 35)
l-Iis eyP sight was bad}~~ iinpaired. (R. 73) His heart
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was enlarged about 100 per cent. (R. 65-6) He was not
mentally alert (R. 58) and had little interest in his business. (R. 35) He would lay on a bed in the back of his
store, ''Tould not wait on customers and would leave his
store unlocked. (R. 35, 191) When in Salt Lake, he would
think he was in Kanab, (R. 108) and did not know his
younger grandchildren. (R. 258) He had to have help
shaving and bathing. (R. 254) He did not have control
over either his bowels or urine. (R. 254)
He did not know when he had to void, (R. 58) and
various witnesses testified that he frequently wet his
clothing. (R. 25-±, 40, 171) According to Dr. Fulstow
this would indicate he was "not in full possession of his
mental facilities." (R. 58) In October, 1955, he locked
himself in a service station restroom, talked irrationally,
complained about there being no toilet paper in the restroom, when in fact there was. ( R. 172, 39)
Throughout this period of time he had few inhibitions about dress. On various occasions and at various
times, beginning as early as 1955, Mr. Johnson would
come into the room where adult women were present
in various stages of undress, sometimes with only his
garments on, and on one occasion without clothing on at
all. (R. 35, 175, 176, 252, 377) He had difficulty orienting
himself as to time and place. (R. 58, 57)
We submit that from the foregoing evidence, the
court properly found that at least since the Spring of
1955 Arthur Johnson was seriously ill and was mentally
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and physically incapacitated from attending to his ordinary business affairs.
(c) SEVERAL WITNESSES TESTIFIED THAT ARTHUR

NEEDED HELP WITH HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS.

William J. Mackelprang testified:
"I think that Carrie kind of took the pep out
of him, her death.
"Oh, I think it kind of made a difference in
him." (R. 120)
Dr. Fulstow said :
"A combination of a number of circumstances
have resulted in what appears to be interference
with his mental function." (R. 61)

"Q. Now, Dr. Fulstow, from your observation of Mr. Johnson's condition during the period
of your treatment, connnencing in April, 1956, and
extending through the present time, what would
be your opinion as to whether :Jir. Johnson was
competent during that period to handle his own
affairs consistently and without help from someone~

''A. I would be inclined to think that during
that period of time he would have need of help
in handling his own affairs." (R. 75)
His brother Vern on Johnson testified that not since
1955 has he "been ahle to function properly in a business
"\vay; that is my honest opinion.~' (R. 111)
(d) ARTHUR JOHNSON LET CALVIN C. JOHNSON TAKE
OVER THE ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS, AND CALVIN OCCUPIED A POSITION OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST.
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Appellants contend that there is no evidence to sustain the finding that Calvin took over the management
of most of Arthur Johnson's properties and business
affairs, or that Arthur had placed considerable confidence and trust in Calvin. We submit that the evidence
almost conclusively shows that he did.
Several witnesses testified that Mr. Johnson's wife
Carrie, was prior to her death, the "business head" and
had assumed the active management of the business
property. (R. 27, 111, 119, 166) Arthur Johnson was
deeply affected by her death in July of 1953. (R. 120)
He was ill at the time, and was hospitalized much of the
Fall and earl:~ Winter of 1953, as is outlined above. The
need for help no doubt existed, and, in any event, numerous witnesses testified that Calvin took over the active
management of Arthur's business affairs. (R. 27, 111,
120, 166, 167) This is further borne out by the documentary evidence and the testimony of the various tenants. There are checks going back to 1955, made payable
to Arthur Johnson by numerous tenants but deposited
to his account by Calvin. See, for example plaintiffs'
Ex. 3 and 9 and R. 473, 558-66. These checks conclusively
show that Calvin was receiving substantial amounts of
rent and placing it in the Arthur Johnson bank
account.
There are also checks conclusively showing that Calvin Johnson was authorized, and did draw checks against
the Arthur Johnson account. For example, the attorney
fee which wa~ paid to Attorney Fenton for drawing
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the deed to the business property is dated November 14,
1956, and is drawn against Arthur Johnson's account and
signed by Calvin. (Ex. 16) See also a check dated :May
8, 1957, drawn to Frank Farnsworth for $40.00, and another check to a Mr. Meeks, dated June 12, 1956. (Ex. 8)
Both of those checks were drawn against Arthur Johnson's account by Calvin.
The testimony of the various witnesses leaves no
doubt that Calvin was in active managernent of the
properties of his father. Respondent X arvol Johnson
testified affirmatively that after his mother's death in
1953, Calvin took charge of their father's business property. (R. 27) Narvol also testified that his father didn't
show much interest in handling the business rentals. (R.
35) "He just lay on the bed sick. Customers would come
into the store, and he wouldn't wait on them.***" (R. 35)
Vern on Johnson was of the opinion that since his
prostate operations Arthur was not able to discharge
his business responsibilities. (R. 111)
Della Johnson also testified affinnatively that Calvin ran his father's business after the n1other, Carrie,
died. (R.166, 167)
Respondent LaFaun Fle1ning testified that her
father was very forgetful by April of 1955. (R. :252)
N arvol also testified that his father owned a Packard automobile; that Calvin traded it in for an automobile for Calvin (R. 21). He also testified that Calvin
received all of the range rights-a 300 head permit-
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which had belonged to his father. (R. 22, 23) Narvol was
asked who operated their father's cattle now, and he answered that they are operated by Calvin. LaFaun Fleming also testified that Arthur Johnson couldn't get
around by himself outside the house; that this was because of a combination of physical and mental disabilities. (H. 254) Mrs. Fleming also testified that after her
rnother's death, her father was depressed; that he was not
able to care for his business affairs and "he turnedCalvin took charge of his business." (R. 270)
Even the witnesses called by the defendants eonfinned Arthur Johnson's disinterest in his business affairs and Calvin's active management. l\1r. Jones was a
tenant of Arthur Johnson. He paid Arthur when he
could, but otherwise paid the rent to Calvin. (R. 395) He
testified that he discussed renewing his lease with Calvin,
and that Arthur "may" have been present. (R. 396, 397)
He needed to get the roof fixed on the building he was
renting frorn Arthur but he said that he saw Calvin about
it. (R. 398) When he was asked if it was not Calvin, he
talked to on the roof, he said, "We talked to both of
them." He ·was then asked in effect if his principal conversation about the roof was not with Calvin, and he
answered "Yes." (R. 398)
Sylvan W. Johnson, who was also called by the defendants, testified on cross-examination that Arthur
Johnson told hirn to pay the rent to Calvin, because he,
(Arthur) was probably going to California. He also
testified that he kept delivering the payments to Calvin,
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although the checks were made payable to Arthur. (R.
4:42) He testified about taking over the grocery store in
February of 1956 from Arthur Johnson, but that Calvin
helped him take the inventory. (R. 451, 452)
Mr. Neaf Swapp was another tenant of Arthur
Johnson. He took over the lease previously made to one
Garn Hamblin. When that lease expired in 1956, he
talked to Calvin about it-not to Arthur. Still, it was his
understanding that he was leasing from Arthur, and he
made his rent checks payable to Arthur, but he delivered
them to Calvin. (R. 473)
There is other evidence of the same type. We think
the record thus conclusively shows that the father did
permit Calvin to manage his affairs and placed trust and
confidence in his son Calvin.
(e) THERE

ARE NUMEROUS ABNORMAL ACTIONS,
SOME NOTED AS EARLY AS 1954.

We will not separately review here all of the items
of abnormal conduct, but they were 1nany, and further
support the findings to the effect that Arthur has been
1nentally and physically incompetent since at least the
Spring of 1955. In 1954 he buried his 1noney in the baseInent of the store. (R. 195) At about this smne tune he
was asked about $30,000 "·hieh his wife had kept l1iclden
in the store, and he said, he just "forgot" where she said
she put it. (R. 2S) In the Fall of 1954: he ·'just forgot'' a
vauable lease of State School lands in Arizona. (R. 27)
On several oceas ions in 1955, l\Ir. Johnson caine downtown with his trousers unbuttoned-just holding on to
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his belt. (R. 35)
Narvol said that Mr. Johnson was in so much pain
in the Spring of 1955 "that he didn't know hardly anything" (R. 38) In April of 1955, when he was staying in
Salt Lake with his daughter, LaFaun, he would on many
occasions forget to dress. (R. 252) He would forget to
eat sometimes, and other times LaFaun would feed hin1
and only a few minutes later he would complain that she
hadn't fed him, and she would fix food again, and he
would again eat. (R. 252, 253)
In April of 1955, he was afraid to go out of the
house in Salt Lake City- afraid he couldn't find his way
around. (R. 332) During his stay at LaFaun's house in
April of 1955, her husband had to bathe and shave Mr.
Johnson. (R. 333) He never bathed himself even a single
time. (R. 336) It was also in April of 1955 that Mr.
Johnson had a bowel movement and "messed all over the
bed and floor" and Mr. Fleming testified "each time I
bathed him, well, he had messed in his garments." (R.
333)

By January 1, 1955, he had lost interest in handling
the business of his rentals. (R. 35) It was at this time
that he would lay on the bed sick and not wait on customers and would leave the store unlocked. (R. 35) By the
Spring of 1955 N arvol noticed that Mr. Johnson "suffered from lapse of memory," and that he could not make
decisions. (R. 36) It was in the Spring of 1955 that he
would rent cabins to various Indians on one day and call
the officers to put them out the next day-then he would
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rent to them again. (R. 36)
His brother Vernon testified that on :\fay 21, 1955,
Mr. Johnson signed a check on which the signature was
so poorly made that Vernon did not think it would go
through the bank. (R. 114) Vern on also said that at this
time Mr. Johnson, while staying at LaFaun's house in
Salt Lake, thought he was in Kanab. (R.108)
All of the above transpired prior to the time he
signed the deed giving Calvin all of the field properties
valued at $12,650.00 on July 20, 1955, and preceded by
more than a year the deed to the business property, on
1fay 20, 1956. In the meantime, everyone recognized that
1fr. Johnson was getting progressively worse. As time
elapsed, he got more careless about coming among people
while he was undressed. (R. 252, 95, 377). In the Fall of
1955 he locked himself in a public restroon1 at a service
station and made a terrible fuss because he said there
wasn't any toilet paper, when in fact there was. (R. 39)
It was in Dece1nber of 1955 that he was wandering
around the hospital ·without knowing where he was, (R.
92) and this happened again on ~fay lS. 1956. (R. 93) By
the Spring of 1956 he would get confused about directions
in l{anab. (R. 125) He stated that he wanted to go to
the post office to get his hair cut. (R. 30) He eon1plained
that thP~' were putting ha~, in the house. (R. 175) He
didn't recognize his daughter-in-law. Della, in whose
house lw had liYed a eonsiderable tune. (R.. 377) He told
of taking an air cireulating fan to be repaired-that he
took it in his Packard. He didn•t have the Packard, and
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he hadn't taken the fan. (R. 174) On July 16, 1956, Della
advised him that his own father had died. Mr. Johnson
just smiled. That was his only reaction. (R. 188-9)
(f) THE CONDUCT OF CALVIN AND ARTHUR AFTER

THE DATE OF THE DEED SHOWS THAT NEITHER
TREATED THE PROPERTY AS BELONGING TO
CALVIN.

There is considerable evidence demonstrating that
even after the deeds were recorded neither Calvin nor his
father Arthur considered Calvin to be the owner of the
property. It is clear that the deed to the business property was given to Calvin on May 20, 1956, on the day
Arthur was temporarily released from the hospital. (R.
505) Thereafter, if the property were his, it would have
been logical for Calvin to notify the tenants that he had
acquired the property from his father, and that they
should make their rent checks payable to Calvin. This
was not done. In most instances for more than a year,
and continuing nearly to the time when respondents discovered the deed, and confronted ·Calvin with it, the tenants all thought they were still renting from Arthur and
still made the checks payable to Arthur. (R. 420-8; 443-8;
+73) The checks were being deposited into Arthur's
account.
~[ore

damaging still to the position now taken by
the appellants is the testimony of G. C. Bonham, who was
a witness called by the appellants. He testified that he
made a lease for part of the Johnson property and took
the property over on J nne 6, 1956. This was some sixteen
days after Calvin allegedly had become the owner of the
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property. This lease was introduced as Ex. Q. It names
Arthur Johnson as lessor and is dated June 1, 1956. (R.
556) By this time Calvin had already recorded the deed,
conveying this property to Calvin absolutely. (Ex. 1)
Calvin and Arthur both signed the lease, but the lease
names only Arthur as the lessor. Since Calvin signed
the lease, it is conclusively shown that Calvin knew that
his father was making a lease on the property after Calvin claimed to own it. Mr. Bonham admitted that Arthur
Johnson was not present when he discussed this lease
with ·Calvin. (R. 560) But when it came time to sign the
lease, Mr. Bonham picked Calvin up at the pool hall and
they went to Arthur's to get Arthur to sign the lease.
Nothing was said about Calvin owning or buying the
property, or about Arthur having conveyed it away. (R.
561) On June 12, 1956, the first rent check was made out
by Mr. Bonham, and it was made payable only to Arthur
Johnson. (R. 562) The check was endorsed, "Arthur
Johnson by CCJ," and it was put in Arthur Johnson's
bank account. (R. 556) Subsequent checks for rent on
this lease throughout the Fall of 1956 and the Spring of
1957 were made payable to Arthur Johnson. (R. 564, 565)
They were all deposited to Arthur Johnson ·s account.
In April of 1957, the first check was 1nade payable to
Calvin, because Calvin told

~Ir.

Bonha1n to make

jt

out

that way. (R. 567)
This is not the

onl~·

lease Inade by )[ r. Johnson after

the d<><>d to Calvin. \Yitness X eaf Swapp. who also was
ealled

h~·

appellants, testified that he had been renting

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

business properties from Arthur since October of 1956.
(R. 367) He took over the lease of a l\Ir. Hamblin. When
the lease expired in 1956, he went to 'Calvin to talk about
a renewal. (R. 473) When he was asked at what date in
1956 he re-negotiated his lease on the property, he answered, ''It "'aS in October, I believe." (R. 474) Beginning in November of 1956, and continuing for several
months thereafter, he made his rent checks payable to
Arthur Johnson, (R. 456) and while he renegotiated the
extension of the lease with Calvin, it was in Arthur's
name. (R. 47-l:)
So in at least two instances after Calvin got the absolute deed to the property on l\Iay 20, 1956, he took the
primary role in renegotiating two leases, one on June 6,
1956, and the other in October of 1956. In both instances
the new leases were made in the name of Arthur Johnson
as lessor. The rent checks were made payable to Arthur
and deposited into Arthur's account by Calvin.
Calvin 1nay have been able to enlighten the court
as to why after he held an absolute deed to the property.
he continued to negotiate leases for his father and in
his father's name, why both he and his father signed
the Bonham lease, and why he received rent checks payable to his father and put them in his father's bank
account. But although he was in court throughout the
trial, he did not take the witness stand to explain any
of these transactions. He occupied a position of trust,
both because of his family relationship, and because
he managed his father's business. He, as we will note
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in more detail below, had a duty to speak, if there were
any explanation for this conduct. He elected to remain
silent, and the law requires the dra,ving of all reasonable
inferences against him.
There are many other things indicating that the
father did not realize he had parted with the title. He
talked to N arvol and N arvol 's ·wife Della to endeavor
to get them to buy his business property in the Fall of
1956. (R. 184) This was long after he had allegedly
deeded it to Calvin. He tried to sell the lot on which
the Dairy Queen is located to a ~fr. Crandall of th~
Salina Bank in October, 1956. ( R. 177, Ex. 5) This
clearly shows that Arthur thought he still owned it. In
August of 1956 he talked in terms of dividing the property into equal thirds for his children. This 'Yas long
after the alleged transfer to Calvin. (R. 185) After ~Iay
20, 1956, he told N arvol to put a trailer court on part
of the property. N arvol said, "what will the other kids
do f' and Arthur said:
"To the devil with the other kids. If I want
to put a trailer Court in there, that is 1ny property, and I can do what I want with it." (R. 186)
The water assessn1ent for the irrigation water for
the field property was paid by Arthur Johnson as late
as 1957. (R. 155) This is inconsistent with the conveyaJwc> to Calvin on July :20, 1955.
Two other things of slight significance in then1selves
at lPa~t that :Jf r. Johnson did not understand the
deed and contract. I~.,ir~t. Narvol's nmne is frequently
i-~how
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misspelled in the documents. The father ought to have
noticed this. Secondly, the deed included all of Lot 3yet the Peach's Trail End Cafe had been sold from this
tract several years before. Mr. Johnson should also have
noted this.
All this conduct is absolutely inconsistent with Calvin's present contention that his father fully knew and
realized that he was conveying to Calvin the field property in 1955 and the business property on May 20, 1956.
Calvin had actual knowledge and participated in most
of the transactions where Arthur still claimed the property. If it was not Arthur's-why didn't Calvin say so~
Calvin not only did not claim the property, but
continued to admit Arthur's ownership. After May 20,
1956, when Calvin had title to the property, he was asked
by N arvol about Calvin's plans to construct the Dairy
Queen on part of this property. N arvol said: "How are
you going to borrow money on Dad's property to build
a cafe on Dad's property~'' Calvin answered: "I am going to borrow it on insurance." (R. 43-4) He was asked
if he was going to borrow on his Dad's insurance, and he
said, no, he would borrow it on his own insurance. N arvol
told Calvin that Calvin had no interest in the property
and should not build on it, and ·Calvin said he was going
to build on it anyway, and then said:
"That will be more rentals, we will have more
to divide up, $300.00 a month more." (R. 44-5)
Calvin also told his sister LaFaun in the Fall of
1956:
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"Well, I have to pay the taxes and the insurance and Dad's expenses, and all the rest is
put aside to be set apart, to be divided." (R. 266)
Calvin was asked about the large amount of money
their mother had hidden, and he said:
"Yes, that's set aside. That's put away. Yes,
it is going to be divided equally when everything
is taken care of." (R. 267)
It is also of importance to note that although rentals
1n excess of $1,000 per 1nonth were being collected by
Calvin for Arthur, Arthur had only 97 cents in the bank
account at Panguitch, and $267 in Salina at the time of
the trial.
(g) THE

NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION ITSELF
DEMONSTRATES A LACK OF BUSINESS SENSE.

Attorney Fenton wrote a letter dated .A.pril 2-±, 1956,
(plaintiffs' Ex. 15) concerning the purc~ase agreement
on the business property. The letter ·was not addressed
to Arthur, but to Calvin. In this letter he notes that
"in the office we talked of leaving the title in shape so
that you (Calvin) could n1ortgage the sa~ne if you felt
it desirable. At another ti1ne in Kanab we talked of putting title in escrow until paid for or of passing title to
you and executing a 1nortgage frmn you to ~-\rt on the
property, to guarantee the payment of the purch::lse.''
I Ie advised Calvin to disenss these security arrangeInents vPr~· carefully with Arthur. Frmn this letter, two
things are el<'ar: First as late as April ~-l-. 1956, Arthur
:-;till did not fulJ~c understand tl1e Inatter. for ~-\ttorney
Fenton wantPd to be sure CnlYin explained it to ~-\rthur;
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and second, the explaining was left for Calvin to do.
Attorney Fenton apparently did not talk ·with Arthur
again until the day the deed and contract were signed.
If it took a normal day or two for the letter to reach
Calvin, he would only have had three or four days to talk
to Arthur before Arthur fainted and was hospitalized
on April 30, 1956.
From April 30th to May 20, 1956, Arthur was
seriously ill, as is outlined above. He was wandering
around the halls of the hospital on May 18th not knowing
where he was, etc. On May 20th, the day he was released from the hospital, Calvin got the deed and contract. They were signed in Calvin's home and in Calvin's
presence. (R. 505, 510, 522)
Since Attorney Fenton had left to Calvin the responsibility for explaining the entire transaction to Mr.
Johnson, it would be very interesting to know whether
Calvin ever did so, but Calvin elected to remain silent,
did not take the witness stand. Again, under well established principles of law, his silence points the finger of
guilt and the court can only infer that had he testified,
the truth from his own lips would have been more
damaging to him than an inference which the court can
draw from his failure to talk. It is reasonable to infer
that Calvin did not explain it. Mr. Fenton had recommended some security arrangement, had asked Calvin
to explain this to Arthur. The contract provided for
none. A deed absolute in form was delivered and recorded. The manner in which the contract and deed
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were handled shows a complete lack of business understanding. When coupled with the fact that Arthur and
Calvin both thereafter consistently treated the property
as still belonging to Arthur, the evidence shows conclusively that Arthur did not know what he was doing
and was not in full control of his mental faculties.
The transaction which was finally executed had no
protection in it whatever for Arthur. The agreement
of purchase which was executed at the same time was
not recorded (R. 371) and it is reasonable to assume that
but for this lawsuit, the agreement to purchase would
never have seen the "light of day.'' If Arthur Johnson
had been in control of his mental faculties sufficient to
permit him to manage his business affairs, and he had
been told about placing the deed in escrow or taking
a mortgage back, the very least he would have done
would have been to see that the agreement of purchase
was recorded along with the deed. The fact that he would
turn over to Calvin absolute title to $150,000 "\Yorth of
property without any security, itself suggests lack of
mental capacity, but the further fact that he would not
record or require Calvin to record, or request his attorney to record the contract of purchase, is sin1ply out
of harmony '.Yith expected conduct of any experienced
lnu;;inessman. Calvin, because of his fmnily ties and the
eontrol he had taken over

~-\.rthur's

business, certainly

owed a fidueiary duty to give Arthur son1e guidance and
protP<'iion. He gave hiin none at all.
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Reference to the agreement itself shows a further
lack of business understanding. The purchase price
most favorably construed provided for payment of only
$50,000. (Ex. 2) If :Mr. Johnson had died, it might have
been nothing. The record stands absolutely uncontradicted to the effect that the property had a value of
$150,000. Appellants state in their brief that there was
some conflict, but there was not any. N arvol fixed the
value at $150,000, (R. 17) and two independent businessmen, who owned similar main street property, each
expressed a similiar opinion. See the testimony of Carl
)icDonald (R. 228) and Odell Watson. (R. 234) Further,
the agreement provided for payments of only $300.00 per
month, or :1;3 of the net income, and did not require the
payment of interest.
The combined rents on the business property were
in the neighborhood of $1,300.00 per month. (R. 14-20,
179-82, -!-!2-9) This isn't in dispute. The rents were as
follows:
Drug Store ______________________________ $100.00
Snack Bar------------------------------ 75.00
Gift Shop________________________________ 80.00
Service Station______________________ 75.00
Pool Hall ________________________________ 200.00
Grocery Store________________________ 80.00
Clothing Store________________________ 100.00
Dairy Queen -------------------------- 300.00
Home -------------------------------------- 80.00
Old Frame Building____________ 150.00
Apartment Above Store ______ 100.00
Total

$1340.00
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He also had some cabins renting for $15.00 per month
each. With the very property covered by the contract
yielding a rental in excess of $1300.00 per month, thE~
fixing of the payment as low as $300.00 or lower if net
income were down and providing that the balance could
be paid without interest, are contrary to all common
business sense.
(h) CALVIN'S APPARENT EFFORT TO ·CONCEAL HIS
ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTY ALSO CON_
DEMNS HIM.

If these transactions were open and above board
and expressed the desires of Arthur Johnson, and if
Arthur Johnson were in full control of his mental faculties, Calvin could have avoided the possibilit~T of this
lawsuit by transacting this business in the open, so that
his other brother and his sister could know about it and
could talk with their father about it. But "the guilty
runneth before they are pursued." Calvin actively endeavored to conceal the acquisition of the property by
him. First, if the field property were fully paid for at
the time the deed was 1nade out on July 20, 1955, there
is absolutely no reason why he should not have recorded
it then, but he did not record it until January of 1958,
several1nonths after this law·suit was filed. (Ex. I) Also
he failed to take the witness stand and explain this at
the trial.
There were 1nany situations w·hich called for Calvin
to speak out. First, he was confronted by the discover~·
of the deed to the business property in J\Iay of 1957. ~.\_
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rather violent family quarrel ensued. Calvin acknowledged that he had the deed to the business property and
said he was going to keep it. The respondents were
complaining that it was not fair, but Calvin didn't
mention that he was buying the property under a contract, nor that he also had the deed to the field property.
and the rattle and the other property. (R. 47, 26-!) The
parties had a hearing on August 6, 1957, concerning the
competency of Arthur Johnson and went into many of
these transactions, and again Calvin did not tell the court
or the parties about the deed to the field property.
Arthur Johnson had a vacant tract of land. Calvin
constructed a Dairy Queen building on it. The respondents asked him about this and asked in effect, •'How
come you are putting a building on Dad's property 1''
Calvin didn't tell them about having the deed, but said
he was going to borrow on some of his (Calvin's) insurance. He also volunteered that this was a good thing
for all three of them; that there would be more money
and property to divide up; that it meant an additional
$300.00 in rent for them. (R. 44-5) At this very time he
was holding the deed and was really putting the Dairy
Queen building on property, which he now claims to
have owned. He was not building it for the benefit of
the three. But he didn't tell them the truth about this.
Again let it be noted that Calvin did not take the witness
stand to deny these conversations, nor explain his conduct.
Further, Calvin recorded the deed to the business
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property in June, only two short weeks after he received it. (Ex. 1) But he didn't record the contract which
would have shown an obligation on his part to pay at
least something for the property. (R. 371) He did not
notify any of the tenants of the alleged change in
ownership, so that except by actually checking the records and discovering the deed, no one would know about
it. F.e let the tenants continue to write their rent checks
payable to Arthur. He continued to put the rent checks
in Arthur's account. (R. 420-8; -±-13-8; 473-9) The sum
total of the rent checks, as noted, were under any possible construction of the testimony more than three times
his monthly payment, as shown by the contract. Since
the deferred balance did not bear interest, he had absolutely no advantage in prepayment, and a deposit to
Arthur Johnson's account of amounts in excess of the
monthly contract payment simply cannot even raise an
inference that these were payments on the contract.
Further, since Calvin did not testify. any inference
drawn must be against him and not for him. In short,
he simply didn't want Arthur or the other children or
the tenants to lmow that he clain1ed to be the mvner
of the property. He was angry when confronted with
the discovery of the deed. He told his sister he had
hated her all his life, and he welc01ned tllis chance to
get even with her. (R. 47, 264) His Yiolent flare of te1nper
when confronted with the deed suggests that he had
"been caught" and he resented it. He did not then try
to defend the transaction on the basis that it was an
arm'~ length negotiated sale. He didn •t tell the1n he had
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agreed to pay $50,000 for the property, or that he had
been making the payments. He simply said it was his,
and he was going to keep it, knowing that his father by
this time in l\t1ay of 1957 was hopelessly incompetent,
and could not contradict him.
The trial court found that while occupying a position of confidence and trust Calvin imposed on his father.
The very day he got out of the hospital and while
.Mr. Johnson ·was seriously ill, Calvin took him to Calvin's home, and in the absence of the other children had
him enter into an unconscionable, unreasonable transaction. The evidence fully sustains these findings and
both Calvin's and Arthur's actions thereafter demonstrate Arthur did not understand what he was doing.
(i) THE COURT SHOULD INFER FROM THE FAILURE

OF APPELLANTS TO TESTIFY, THAT THEIR
TESTIMONY, INSTEAD OF REFUTING, WOULD
HAVE SUPPORTED THE INFERENCES AGAINST
THEM.

We have noted above that neither of appellants
elected to testify. Both were sitting in court throughout
every minute and day of the trial. Neither placed himself upon the witness stand to vindicate what he had
done in connection with securing this valuable property
from an old and sick man. Calvin was content to attempt
through his counsel on cross-examination to malign the
integrity and character of his brother and sister, but was
not sufficiently convinced of the propriety of his own
actions to submit to the same type of interrogation.
His counsel states in the brief that Calvin was a "sober"
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man and that he was not addicted to drink. There is not
one word of evidence to this effect.
Under the cases, it does not matter that respondents
could have called Calvin as an adverse witness. The
defense was for Calvin to make. When he elected to
remain mute, the only inference the court can draw is
that the truth would have been more damaging to him
than the strongest inferences which could be drawn from
his silence.
The cases are absolutely uniform in so holding.
The matter is discussed in some detail in "\Vigmore on
Evidence,'' Third Edition, Sec. 289, page 172. Wigmore
quotes with approval from the case of Attorney General
v. Pelleteir, 240 ~lass. 264, 134 NE 407, as follo"Ws:
"Instant impulse, spontaneous anxiety and
deep yearning, to repel charges thus impunging
his honor would be expected from an innocent
man. Refusal to testify himself or to call available witnesses in his o"\vn behalf under such circumstances warrants inferences unfa\orable to
respondent. It is conduct in the nature of an admission. It is evidence against hiin. Tins principle
of law has long been established and consistently
applied. The reason is that it is an attribute of
human nature to resent such imputations. In the
face of such accusations. n1en connnonlv do not
remain mute, but voice their denials "ith~ earnestness, if the:v can do so with honesty. Culpabilit:alone seals their lips. The law siinply reeognizes
the natural probative force of conduct contrarY
to that of the ordinan~ 1nan of integrit~~."
·
Professor \Vigmore states that this principle of law
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i::; ahnost uniformly followed. He cites the case of United
States v. illammoth Oil Company, 1-t F. 2d 705, which
was affirmed by the United States Supre1ne Court, and
states that the analysis of Judge Kenyon is an excellent
statement of the rule. The discussion on this point begins
at page 729. The court in part noted:
"These gentlemen have the right to remain
silent, to evade, to refuse to furnish information,
and thus to defy the government to prove its
case; but a court of equity has the right to draw
reasonable and proper inferences from all the
circumstances in the case, and especially from
the silence of Secretary Fall, and from the failure
of Sinclair to testify. It is not sufficient answer
that the government m~ght have used Sinclair as
a witness. He was properly a wvtness for the
defense.''
The trial court had noted that the entire transaction had been revealed by other witnesses, and that
the failure of Sinclair to testify was, therefore, not important and might only raise the inference that he failed
to testify because he knew nothing further, but the
appellate court disagreed and said:
''We do not reach the same conclusion under
the record. We fail to perceive why, under all the
circumstances revealed in this case, it should be
presumed that Sinclair knew nothing more than
the other witnesses.*** With important and controlling facts in Sinclair's possession, and with a
train of circumstances that aroused the gravest
suspicion as to corruption practiced in securing
the lease laid at his door, his failure to testify
is a 1natter of deep significance. There is a pre-
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sumption in the law that, if a litigant have facts
within his knowledge and refuses to reveal them,
it is presumed that if revealed they would be
against him."
See also Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry.
4 CCA 454.

Co.~-

Ellis, 54 Fed. 481,

The cases all hold, of course, that there must be
"laid at the door" of the defendant by evidence tending
to show improper conduct, a situation ·which would
induce a normal man to speak. Clearly the evidence does
this here. Calvin is accused of imposing on his aged,
sick and incapacitated father. If he paid full value for
the field property in an arm's length transaction in 1955,
all he had to do to completely clear his name was to
tell the court what he paid, how he paid it, and the circumstances under which his father deeded it to him, but
he chose to ren1ain silent. The sa1ne is true as to the
agreement of sale and the deed to the business property.
Evidence had been adduced to show· that the property
was worth more than $150,000; that it produced rents
of Inore than $1300 per nwnth. He had procured a deed,
without paying anything for it. and had kept hidden a
contract purporting to let hnn buy the property for
on<•-third of its vahw. without interest. and '"-ith 1nonthly
pa~·nH'nts in an a1nount far less than the rental. He
\ra~ confronted with evidence that he and his father
had both thereafter treated the property as still belonging to the father. He had heard the testi1nony that
liP lmd ht>Pn collecting the rent and handling his father's
propPrties-dra\\·ing checks on his father's account. He
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had heard the testimony that with $1300.00 per month
coming in as rent, the father's bank accounts were empty.
Certainly the reason for him to speak had been "laid at
the door." He elected to remain mute. The court, therefore, properly concluded that he had no explanation;
that the father did think that the property was still his
and did not realize that he had parted with title. Thus,
the strong evidence of physical and mental incapacity,
is corroborated by the admissions and inferences that
flow from the defendants' election to remain silent.
(j) THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND

CONFIDENCE BETWEEN C A L VI N AND HIS
FATHER, WHICH PLACED THE BURDEN ON CALVIN TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY
TO HIM WAS PROPER.

Where a fiduciary relationship exists, and there is
a transfer without adequate consideration, the burden
is on the donee to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the donor had his full mental faculties and
acted without fraud or undue influence on the part of
the donee. This principle is recognized by the recent
Utah case of Jardine v Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 279
P. 2d 454. In that case the trial court had found that
there was no fraud or undue influence; that the mother
had full control of her mental faculties and had made a
gift to her two younger children because she wanted to.
The appellents had urged that there was a presumption
of fraud created by the fiduciary relationship which
there existed, and that this presumption was even strong
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enough to warrant the reversal of the trial court's finding that there was no fraud or mental incapacity. In
affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court recognized
the existence of the presumption, but held under the
evidence of that case that the presumption had been
rebutted.
The trial court had found that a confidential relationship existed-as the trial court has found here.
The evidence upon which that finding was based showed
only that the donor was eighty years old, that she was
suffering from high blood pressure, hardening of the
arteries, and headaches, being forgetful at times and
even eccentric. In addition, one of the donees took care
of her finances and operated her farm. The Supreme
Court said this evidence "clearly sustains" a finding
that a confidential relationship existed.
All of these elements are present here. The trial
court in this case has found that ~Ir. Johnson was sick
and mentally incompetent. In both cases the relationship
was one of parent and child. In both cases, in addition
to the blood relationship, the donee 1nanaged the finances
for the parent. In both cases the trial court found that
a confidential and fiduciary relationship existed and
under the holding of the J a.rd ine rase. the evidence
"elearly sustains" this finding. The consequence of such
a holding is noted in the Jardine rase as follows:
"It is well settled that where a fiduciarY or
confidential relationship exists between the d~nor
and donee, equity raises a presumption against
the validit~· of such transactions and the burden
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is cm;t upon the donee to prove their validity and
that there was no fraud or undue influence by
proving .affirmatively and by clear and convincing
evidence compliance with equitable requisites.
This is because there is implied in every fiduciary
or confidential relationship a superiority held by
one of the parties over the other. * * * Whether
the donee has sustained his burden of proof necessarily depends upon the facts adduced in each
case."
Thus under the ruling of the J ardi'ne case, the burden was on ·Calvin to prove not by a mere preponderance, but by "clear and convincing proof" that the
transaction \Yas entirely proper. As to his own intimate
connection with these transfers, Calvin elected to remain
silent. The evidence he adduced to rebut the inference
and to carry the burden of proof which was thus by law
placed upon him amounted to little more than the calling
of several tenants who had observed Mr. Johnson from
time to time, and said "hello" to him. They said he appeared normal. Each of the tenants confessed that if he
had problems with his lease he went to Calvin-not to
Arthur; that while he made the rent checks payable to
Arthur, payment was delivered to Calvin and deposited
by him to Arthur's account; when they wanted to renew
their lease, they went to Calvin, and after it was discussed, Calvin took them to Arthur. Calvin was present
when the leases were renegotiated and signed. Calvin-not Arthur-helped with the inventory when the store
was sold. A bishop, who called on Arthur frequently,
was calle.d to testify that he gave Arthur a temple re-
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commend. Attorney Fenton was also called to give the
details on the delivery of the deeds.
The trial court was not required to accept the testimony of Mr. Fenton that Mr. Johnson appeared to be
all right as against the inferences and affirmative evidence to the contrary. At the outset, ~Ir. Fenton demonstrated that his memory was not too clear on the transactions . .J[r. Fenton had testified that the will definitely
was signed the day ~Ir. Johnson got out of the hospital,
and at Calvin's home. (R. 505, 522) However, some
months after the will was signed, Attorney Fenton had
written a letter, dated the 13th day of September, 1956,
(Ex. J) clearly stating that he had no clear recollection
as to where the will was signed. In the body of the
letter he stated: "This was signed b:- Art in Kanab, if
1ny memory is correct, and at the same time oCalvin
executed a will of his own. I presume Arthur has turned
possession of the will to Calvin, but at the smne time
I am not certain of this." Then in longhand at the end
·of the letter he said: "Faun: This will may have been
signed in 111~~ office, but I an1 certain it has been signed."
This evidence thus discloses that ~lttorney Fenton didn't
re1nernber too clear}~~ the details of this transaction.
There i:::; also a letter frmn ~\ ttorney Fenton (Ex.
15) which was written on April :2-!, 1956, to Cahin-not
to Arthur. He told Calvin to go to ~\rthur and be sure
that Arthur understood the nature of the transaction.
Thi:::; letter clearly shows that as of that date ~Ir. Fenton
was not :::;atisfied that he had given Arthur full.advice or
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that Arthur fully understood the matter. While he thus
urged Calvin to explain it carefully to Arthur, Calvin
never took the witness stand, and we have no testimony to the effect that Calvin did explain it to Arthur.
There is much to indicate that he did not for only a few
days later Arthur became seriously ill and was hospitalized most of the time from April 30th to May 20th, when
he signed the deed.
The letter of April 24th also indicates that he may
also have been to some extent at least looking out for
the interest of Calvin, perhaps had prepared Calvin's
"'ill too, for he said in the later letter to Faun that Calvin
made a will on the same day. In November, 1956, the
bill which he sent was paid by Calvin, but from Arthur
.Johnson's account.
Finally, there is a natural inclination for anyone to
defend a transaction in which he participated. In a
transaction of this kind, the complaining parties are
never present. The only evidence they can ever offer is
circumstantial. They can only raise inferences suggesting
that the act was not the free and voluntary act of the
donor. This is clearly noted by our Supreme Court in
Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P. 2d 542. This
case concerned the mental capacity of the decedent. The
will had been witnessed by the attorney who drew the
\:rill. He had testified in a manner calculated to support
the will. The trial court had found against the will. In
sustaining that decision, the Supreme Court noted that
the trial court didn't need to accept as fact the testimony
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of an individual who had an interest 1n the outcome,
and said:
"This is not limited to where the witnesses
are actually parties or have a direct pecuniarv
interest, but in addition, there may be the cas~,
as here, where the ·witnesses (both connected with
the executor, either as employees or counsel)
have an interest by way of vindicating the propriety of their conduct. Such matters are of particular importance to consider under circumstances where those whose rights are ·affected.
were not present when events which later proved
to be of critical importance transpired They are
left to accept the testimony of those who were
present or to discredit it by showing adverse interest, inconsistency, unreasonableness or other
weaknesses therein."
In this case, we don't even have the testimony of aU
the participants in the transaction, because the appellants, as noted above, elected to remain mute. \V e have
a fiduciar~- relationship, which in law placed upon appellants as recipients of the property, while Calvin held
a fiduciary position, the burden to come forward with
clear and convincing evidence. This burden cannot be
1net b~- his re1naining silent, and by the observations
of Calvin's tenants that Arthur looked all right, and
h~- the above referred to testimony of the attorney. Had
the trial court found that Arthur Johnson had full possession of his 1nental and physical faculties, and that
there was no fraud or undue influence, we would have
had an entirely different problem. Even such a findin~
by the trial court, probably could have been overturned,
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because contrary to the clear evidence, but we don't have
that problem here. The trial court has found that Arthur
Johnson was sick, did not have his mental faculties, was
physically disabled, that he did repose special trust and
confidence in Calvin, and that Calvin abused the confidence and by fraud and undue influence, and while the
father was out of contact with his other children, procured without adequate consideration all of his properties. Our problem is only one of determining whether the
evidence will sustain these findings. We submit that it
clearly does, even unaided by any inference or presumption. But the evidence does not stand alone. An inference
of culpability and guilt is drawn from the silence of appellants at the trial. They also had the burden by clear
and convincing evidence of overcoming the presumption
which arose out of their confidential relationship. This
presumption is one which remains in the case and can
be weighed and considered as evidence. See In Re Swan
Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682, where the court
said:
"A presumption which shifts the burden of
persuasion does not vanish from the case upon
a prima facie showing but remains throughout
the case to require the fact finder to decide such
issue of fact against the party having such burden
unless he is convinced by the required degree of
proof or measure of persuasion that the facts on
that issue are contrary to such presumption. So,
in this case, since we hold that this presumption
shifts the burden of persuasion that there was no
fraud or undue influence onto the proponents of
the will, the fact finder must find that issue

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
against them unless he was convinced from the
evidence that there was no fraud or undue influence."
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence, together with these presumptions, adequately sustain the
trial court's findings.
II. IN AN EQUITY CASE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THE
APPELLATE ·COURT, EXCEPT WHERE THEY ARE MANIFESTLY IN ERROR.

As is noted above, there is only one issue of law
raised, to-wit, were appellants entitled to a jury trial as
to the validity of the will~ All other issues relate to
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of
fact. Although in an equity case, the court is to review
both the law and the facts, the findings of fact by the
trial court are not to be lightly set aside. The "Ctah
Supreme Court has stated the rule many times. For
example, in the case of First Security Bank of Utah r.
Burgi, 122 Vtah -1-15, 251 P. 2d 297, the court said:
"Wllile upon an appeal of a case in equity,
this court 1nay review the findings of fact as well
as the conclusions of law; nevertheless. the findings of the trial court ''ill not be set aside unless
it manifest!~- appears that the court has misapplied the proven facts, or 1nade findings clearly
against the weight of the eYidence."
This rule obtains for the ver~- practical reason that
the trier of the facts had the witnesses before hln1, was
able to observe their de1neanor, and evaluate their
credibilit~-. It is sub1nitted that on this record, the court
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cannot properly conclude that it "manifestly" appears
that the trial court has misapplied proven facts or made
findings "clearly" against the weight of the evidence.
III. THERE IS NO DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO THE SHOWING NECESSARY TO PROVE
LACK OF CAPACITY.

The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions had before it the necessity for stating the test for
determining mental capacity to make a deed. Some of
these cases are referred to by appellants. There apparently is no dispute between the parties as to the
law on this point. Some of the important cases in this
regard are: Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.
2d 142; H.atch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 Pac. 443; Anderson v. Johnson, 1 Utah 2d 400, 268 P. 2d 427; In Re
LaMonte's Estate, 95 Utah 219, 79 P. 2d 649; Blackburn
~-. Jones, 59 Utah 558, 205 Pac. 582. See also Russworm t'.
Mims (Okla). 164 P. 2d 238, and Sparks v. Sparks, (Cal.)
226 Pac. 2d 238.
We will not prolong this brief to discuss all of the
above cases in detail. However, the facts in In Re Laltfonte's Estate, supra, and Anderson v. Johnson, supra,
are strikingly similar to the facts in the instant case. In
the LaM ante case, the grantee in the deed to certain property ran his mother's business for her and secured a
deed from her to the property. She was eighty years of
age, senile and failing in memory. The court held that
there was sufficient evidence of incompetence.
In Anderson v. Johnson, supra, the suit was brought
to determine the validity of certain deeds. The grantor

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

had a similar illness to that of Arthur Johnson here, and
the grantee played an active role in making the deed and
the will. The court held that the evidence of the grantor's
mental incapacity was sufficient.
In Russworm v. Mims, the Oklahoma case cited
above, the court held that a deed executed for grossly
inadequate consideration, by a person of great -weakness
of mind, arising from age, sickness, or other cause, but
not amounting to absolute disqualification, will be set
aside by the court on proper and reasonable application
of the injured party.
The case of Sparks v. Sparks, the California case
cited above, involved fraud and confidential relationship.
The court said that gross inadequacy of consideration
for conveyance of realty, combined "ith the grantor's
dependence on the trust and confidence of the grantee
is sufficient to sustain a declaration of fraud rendering
the deed void.
We submit that under the above authorities, the conclusions drawn by the trial court from the facts in tllis
case are legally correct.
IV. THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING A JURY
TRIAL ON THE ISSUES INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF
THE WILL.

Although this point i8 the first issue raised by the
appellants in their brief, we haYe deferred discussing
it, because it i8 better analyzed against a complete background of the facts. A careful examination of the will
(Ex. 1-t-) reveals that by its terms the devisees and le-
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gatees nained therein are the same persons and would
take in the same proportions as is provided by the law
of succession in the event of intestacy. Without regard
to what the final outcome of this case is, appellants will
share in the property in exactly the same way, for under
either the will or the statutes on succession, Calvin will
share equally with respondents. The only way in which
the appellants could possibly be prejudiced is that under
the will appellant Calvin was appointed executor and
appellant Anna was appointed contingent executrix to
act without bond.
(a) THIS IS NOT A "WILL CONTEST."

We contend that there was no error in the denial
of the jury trial on this issue. The right to a jury trial
in a will case is statutory. Our applicable Utah statutes
would be 75-14-18 and 78-21-1, U.C.A. 1953. The Utah
court in several cases has said that "will contest cases"
are law cases and has indicated that they should be
tried by a jury. See, for example, In Re George's Estate,
100 Utah 230, 112 P. 2d 498; In Re Buttars, 123 Utah
596, 261 P. 2d 171; In Re LaVelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253.
While we think the comment in each of these cases was
dicta, we will not analyze them jn detail, because we do
not believe that this is a will contest.

A will contest case arises only after the death of
the decedent, where the rights of the parties have vested
and a suit is brought to enforce legal rights. Before the
death of the decedent, the heirs named in an existing
will have no vested legal rights. The mere expectancy
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of an heir is not regarded as property, and the testator
can, without the consent of his heirs, change a will at
any time. See Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Edition,
Sec. 171. "A contest moreover cannot be initiated in advance of offer to probate of the will which is sought to
be contested." Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Edition,
Sec. 162.
At the time of the trial here, Arthur Johnson was
still living, but was incompetent. It was not necessary
under the law to await his death, so that the parties
could offer the will for probate and have a will contest.
It was entirely proper for the guardians of Arthur
Johnson to bring a suit in equity to have the will declared void during Arthur Johnson's lifetime. Such a
suit is not a will contest, but is an action to set aside
an instrument. The grounds are mental incapacity and
fraud. This raises only equitable issues; it does not involve legal rights. No rights are vested under a will
until the testator's death. In '-iew of Cah·-in's conduct,
the guardians would have been derelict in their duty had
they not sought on Arthur's behalf to '"'ithdraw or cancel
the appointment of Calvin as executor.
Appellants confess that an action to set aside a
deed on the grounds of fraud or Inental incapacity is
an equity case, triable without a jury. They also concede
that an action to rescind the contract, or to set it aside
on the same grounds is equitable and not triable to a
jnry. (See appellants' brief page 19) Such a confession
by appellants is, of course, in cmnplete harn1ony with the
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existing law. \Vhy should there be any other or different
rule of law if the instrument being attacked is a will
instead of a deed or a contract~ Actions to set aside
instnunents executed by people without mental capacity
or to rescind because of fraud have always been considered equitable actions, triable by the court \vithout a
jury.
The Inatter is treated in the West Digest Systmn
under the title "Juries," Sec. 14(6) Recent cases applying the rule are Summers v. M artim, 77 Idaho 469, 295
P. 2d 265, (an action to rescind a contract and for money
damages); Ward v. Lindly, (Okla.) 294 P. 2d 296, (an
action to cancel a deed because of grantor's incapacity
and for possession); Goodson v. Smith (Wyo.) 243 P.
2d 163, (an action to cancel a contract on grounds of
fraud).
We submit that a suit of this type brought during
the testator's lifetime before the rights of any of the
parties have vested as legal rights is identical to a suit
to vacate a deed or a contract.
(b) IF THE WILL ISSUES ARE HELD TO BE LEGAL,
THEY, NEVERTHELESS, WERE ENTWINED WITH
EQUITABLE ISSUES, AND THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY COULD TRY BOTH WITHOUT A JURY.

If it were to be conceded that a suit brought to vacate a will during the testator's lifetime were a will contest, where Calvin had legal rights which had attached
and which he could enforce against Arthur Johnson, even
then appellants were not entitled to a jury trial. In a
suit where issues raised are both legal and equitable,
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the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the incidental
legal points can be tried by the court without a jury
if the major issues are equitable in nature, and the
problems are entwined. Appellants confess in their brief
that the major issues here were equitable. In determining
the validity of the will and validity of the deeds, the
evidence to be adduced was absolutely identical. It was
not possible, without a multiplicity of suits, to separately try the issue on the will and the issue on the
deeds and contract of sale. From this identical evidence,
it was for the court to determine mental capacity to
make the deeds, and the contract, and to determine
·whether there was fraud and undue influence. This appellants concede. But they then wanted a jury to sit and
review the identical evidence to determine whether the
jury thought the capacity existed to make the will, and
"'Whether it was free from fraud and undue influence. Thi'3
has been often considered by the r tah Supren1e Court.
In Norback 1./. Board of Directors of Churclz Extension
Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339, the court said:
"If the issues are legal. or the Inajor issue
legal, either party is entitled upon proper dernand to a jury trial ; but if the issues are
equitable or the 1najor issues to be resolved by
an application of equity. the legal issues being
1nerely subsidiary, the action should be regarded
as equitable, and the rules of equity apply."
The holding of this case was Inodified to some extent h~· the court in Fallcy JJJortuar.ll v. Fairbanks, 119
Utah 204, :2:2:> P. 2d 739. There the court, in regard to
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cases where the legal and equitable issues are intertwined stated in a comment on the Nor back case that :
"Appraised in the light of the California
rule, the Norback case is apparently correct in
result, but the rule there laid down as to when
litigants are entitled to a trial by jury, which
we have quoted above, cannot be reconciled with
the California rule which we have approved and
adopted in this opinion."
But then the court went on to say:
"There may be certain types of cases, although none occur to us now, in which the issues
of fact in the legal cause of .act~on are so intertwined with the issues of fact in the equitable
cause of action that they cannot be separated for
the purpose of trial by jury. Only then would it
seem that the court should determine whether
the major issue or issues are legal or equitable
and grant or deny a jury trial accordingly."
It is submitted that if both legal and equitable issues
of fact are present in this case (which we deny) the
major issues certainly are equitable. These equitable
issues are so intertwined factwise, with the problems on
the validity of the will, that they could not be separated
for the purposes of the trial. Under the above quoted
rule, the court's decision denying the jury trial should be
upheld.
(c) EVEN IF APPELLANTS WERE ENTITLED TO A

JURY, THE ERROR WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREJUDICIAL.

Finally, we contend that the denial of the right of
jury trial is, in any event, not prejudicial. We have already noted that the will does not change the distribution
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of the property from that provided by the statutes
governing succession. We are litigating here only the
right of Calvin and Anna Johnson to serve as executors. The Utah statute, Section 75-3-15, U.C.A. 1953,
expressly provides :
"No person is competent to serve as an executor who at the time the will is admitted to probate is either adjudged by the court incompetent
to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
* * * want of integrity."
If the findings of the trial court in this case concerning the major issue are sustainable under the evidence, Calvin would never be permitted to act as executor
of this estate-his conflicts with it are too great, and
the adjudication that he defrauded his father of all of
his properties would disqualify him to act. Arthur
Johnson has now died and the question as to who will
act as executor will soon exist. If the findings concerning
the primary issues (the deeds and the contract) are
reversed, and Calvin is held to OW'll the property absolutely, there isn't any estate to probate. But if the
holding of the trial court stands, and all this valuable
property comes back into the estate. it 1nust be probated. Either under the will or under the statute, it ·will
go equally to the parties to this suit. In such an eYent
because of the ilnputations of fraud, Cah'in has been
adjudged to lack basic integrit~~. He '''"ould not be permitted to execute the duties of the trust ilnposed by law
on the executor of an estate. Further, we belieYe that
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the evidence in this case, aided by the presumptions refeiTed to above, so strongly establishes the want of
mental capacity and the existence of fraud and undue
influence, that a directed verdict \vould have been required.
It is, therefore, submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
V. PERSHING NELSON
Attorneys for Respondents
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